Abstract. New asymmetric cipher based on matrix power function is presented. Cipher belongs to the class of recently intensively evolving non-commuting cryptography due to expectation of its resistance to potential quantum cryptanalysis.
Introduction
One of the first sources declaring non-commuting cryptography was (Sidelnikov et al., 1993) . In 200x the state of the art of this perspective field of investigation was presented in seminal book (Myasnikov et al., 2008) . In recent time non-commuting cryptographic primitives such as McEliece PKC are considered as a perspective trend of post quantum cryptography (McEliece, 1978) . In 2007 authors published a new key agreement protocol based on matrix conjugator search problem in combination with matrix discrete logarithm function . This key agreement protocol was named as STR (Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas, Raulynaitis) and was studied in detail in several sources available on web (Ottaviani et al., 2011; Jacobs, 2011; Sracic, 2011) . In 2012 it was concluded in Myasnikov and Ushakov (2012) , that this algorithm does not provide strong security for quantum computers.
Continuing our research in non-commuting cryptography we present here a new asymmetric cipher based on matrix power function (MPF). MPF was previously used for key agreement protocol (Sakalauskas et al., 2008) and asymmetric cipher construction (Sakalauskas and Luksys, 2007; Sakalauskas and Luksys, 2012) .
We expect, that the proposed asymmetric cipher has an effective realization in restricted computational environments as it was shown by Ottaviani et al. (2011) for STR key agreement protocol.
Preliminaries
Let Z n = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} be a finite ring of integers where the multiplication and addition are performed modulo n. These operations are associative and commuting and we will take it in mind below by default. It is well known, that if n is prime, then Z n is a field. Conveniently, we denote a multiplicative group in Z n consisting of integers relatively prime to n by Z * n . We denote the order of Z * n by |Z * n | and it's value is determined by the value of Euler's totient function φ(n).
Since the group Z * n is multiplicative, the powering of its elements can be defined. Referencing to Carmichael's theorem (Carmichael, 1912) we can see, that for any element g ∈ Z * n the power x of an element g x is in Z λ(n) , i.e x ∈ Z λ(n) , where λ(n) is the Carmichael function. This function can be defined as the smallest positive integer λ, which satisfies the identity g λ = 1 mod n for all g coprime with n. Note, that Z λ(n) is determined by the value of n.
At first we consider a general case. Let S be some abstract multiplicative commuting semigroup and assume, that powers of elements of S are in some commuting numerical ring R i.e.
It is clear, that characterization of R depends on the properties of semigroup S as it was shown in the case of Z * n . Based on these facts we turn to definition of MPF as an action of M R × M R in M S , where M R is a matrix ring and M S is a matrix semigroup defined over R and S respectively.
We define a matrix Q = {q ij } in a semigroup M S and name it as base matrix. We also define matrices X = {x ij } and Y = {y ij } in a ring M R and name them as power matrices. Hence q ij ∈ S, x ij , y ij ∈ R. All of the defined matrices are square of order m.
Let matrix Q = {q ij } powered by matrix Y = {y ij } from the right be a matrix C = {c ij }, i.e.
where elements of C are computed by the formula
In a similar way by powering matrix Q from the left by matrix X = {x ij } we obtain a matrix D = {d ij }, i.e.
where elements of D are computed by the formula
Furthermore we can use a combination of both functions to define a two-sided matrix power function or MPF by powering matrix Q from the left and right by matrices X and Y respectively. Denoting the result matrix by E = {e ij } we have the following MPF definition:
where according to (2) and (4) the elements e ij are computed by the formula: It is clear, that the result matrices C, D and E are in M S . Since the base matrix Q is defined in M S we name it as a platform semigroup, and power matrices X and Y are defined in M R we name it accordingly as a power ring.
Let us now present two lemmas, which indicate important properties of MPF for cryptographic protocols construction (Sakalauskas and Luksys, 2007) . We denote the ordinary matrix multiplication in M R by XY .
Lemma 1. If R is commuting numerical semiring and S is commuting semigroup, then MPF defined by
Lemma 2. If R is commuting numerical semiring and S is commuting semigroup, then MPF defined by (6) is an action of M R × M R in M S satisfying the following identity
The construction of suggested asymmetric cipher is based on the conjecture, that MPF is a candidate one-way function (OWF). This means, that direct MPF value (i.e. matrix E) computation for given instances Q, X and Y in (5) is algorithmically effective while the inverse value computation to find any X and Y for instances Q and E is infeasible. We name the problem of finding matrices X and Y , satisfying equation (5) as MPF problem, when Q and E are given.
Asymmetric Cipher
Let the sender Bob be willing to encrypt a message M by receiver's Alice's public key, which can be decrypted by Alice's private key. According to the structure of the proposed cipher M is a matrix of order m with entries coded in binary form. This will be explained in example below.
Let Q be a public matrix selected from matrix semigroup M S and let Z 1 and Z 2 be two public non-commuting matrices selected from matrix ring M R . The necessity of two noncommuting matrices will be explained below. Alice randomly selects non-singular secret matrix X in M R and computes a secret matrix U as a product of polynomials of Z 1 and Z 2 i.e. U = P U (Z 1 ) · P U (Z 2 ), when polynomial P U () is secret and chosen at random. Alice's private key PrK A is a pair of matrices (X, U ), i.e. PrK A = (X, U ). Her public key is a triplet of matrices A 1 , A 2 and E, i.e.
Bob takes Alice's public key PuK A and performs a following encryption protocol:
1. Bob chooses randomly a non-singular matrix Y in M R . 2. He selects a random secret polynomial P V () and computes a secret matrix V = P V (Z 1 ) · P V (Z 2 ). Then he takes matrices A 1 and A 2 and computes a matrix 
we denote by encryptor ε and sends it to Alice together with C.
To decrypt Bob's message Alice does the following:
1. Using given matrices B 1 and B 2 Alice computes
Alice raises matrix V Q Y to the power Y −1 U Y on the right and then raises the result matrix to the power X on the left and hence obtains a matrix XV Q U Y which is the same encryption key K. 3. Alice can now decrypt a ciphertext C using encryption key K and relation
Note, that neither of matrices used to obtain an encryption key are commuting. To illustrate the proposed cipher we give a following example:
• Alice and Bob agree on a public group Z * 15 = {1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14}, i.e. the platform group is defined over S = Z * 15 . Since g 4 = 1 for all g ∈ Z * 15 , the power ring is defined over R = Z 4 . Note, that all the actions in a platform group are performed modulo 15 and all the actions in a power ring are performed modulo 4.
• Alice and Bob agree on a public base matrix Q and two public non-commuting power matrices Z 1 and Z 2 . Let
• Alice chooses her secret non-singular power matrix
• Alice computes a secret power matrix U using a polynomial P U (x) = x 2 + 3x. Hence
• Alice calculates matrix E:
• Alice calculates power matrices A 1 and A 2 :
• Alice has her private key PrK A = (X, U ) and her public key PuK A = (A 1 , A 2 , E).
Since S = Z * 15 and operations in Z * 15 are taken modulo 15, the elements of matrix M can be coded by 4 bits and hence M = {m ij }, where m ij ∈ Z 16 .
Let Bob be willing to encrypt a message Bob takes Alice's public key PuK A and performs a following encryption protocol:
• He selects a random non-singular power matrix
• Bob calculates power matrices V and W using a secret polynomial P V (x) = 2x 2 +x. Hence
• Bob calculates the key matrix
• Bob calculates the ciphertext
11 10 1 12 12 2 0 3 13   .
• Bob computes power matrices B 1 , B 2 and the matrix F
• Bob sends ε = (B 1 , B 2 , F ) and C to Alice.
The decryption is as follows:
• Alice computes the power matrix Y −1 U Y using her polynomial P U (x)
• Alice computes the key matrix
• Alice decrypts the message 
Security Analysis
We will now introduce the matrix discrete logarithm function on the base of convenient discrete logarithm function. Note, that we do not consider both ordinary and matrix discrete logarithm problem (DLP) hard, since we will not use large semigroup S to define platform semigroup M S . Suppose, that matrix Q is defined over some cyclic group G i.e. S = G. Let the generator g of the group G be given. A discrete logarithm ld g with the base of this generator of Q Y can be applied to (1) to obtain
where ld g Q and ld g C mean, that the discrete logarithm is applied to all entries of matrices Q and C respectively. In the same way we can apply matrix discrete logarithm function to (3) i.e.
Assume, that matrix (ld g Q) −1 exists. Then by multiplying both sides of (7) by (ld g Q) −1 we get
The same is true for (8), i.e
Since we can apply matrix discrete logarithm function to (1) and (3) we can also apply it to (5) to get
where T = ld g Q. The way to break the presented asymmetric cipher specification is to find matrices X and Y , when T and ld g E are given. This problem is similar to well known NP-complete problem, namely multivariate quadratic (MQ) problem. We name the problem defined by (9) as matrix MQ problem (MMQ).
Let us consider the conditions under which the discrete logarithm can be applied to (5). Let S = Z * n be a non-cyclic group with n being a composite integer. According to Chinese remainder theorem, the group Z * n is isomorphic to the multiplicative group Z * p × Z * q . Since Z * p and Z * q are cyclic groups, the generators of both groups can be found. The multiplicative group Z * p × Z * q is then isomorphic to the following direct product of two additive groups Z (p−1) × Z (q−1) with the isomorphism defined as
where g p and g q are generators of Z * p and Z * q respectively (Clifford and Preston, 1961) . Hence the group Z * n is also isomorphic to Z (p−1) × Z (q−1) . We can now use an isomorphism ϕ from Z * p × Z * q to Z (p−1) × Z (q−1) defined by (10) to find a discrete logarithm of the matrix Q, given that all elements q ij are selected from Z * n . In this case the complexity of MPF problem is defined by the complexity of several MMQ problems. We think, that we can make a conjecture, that if we prevent the MPF problem transformation to MMQ problem, then the complexity of such MPF problem will be rather higher than complexity of corresponding MMQ problem. The necessary conditions for this will be presented below. These conditions depend on the algebraic structure of S.
Let us consider a multiplicative semigroup Z n = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, where n = pq is a composite integer and p, q are distinct odd primes with p > q. Semigroup Z n contains a subgroup Z * n of order φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Let us construct a set Z ♯ n being a union of Z * n and some ideal I d q (Z n 
It is easy to prove, that Z ♯ n is a semigroup under multiplication. Let S = Z ♯ n and let C 1 and C 2 be two cyclic subgroups of Z * n having maximal order. Notice, that Id q (Z n ) is also a cyclic group of order |Id q (Z n )| = (p − 1). Hence the order of generators of Id q (Z n ) is (p − 1). We propose the elements of the base matrix Q to be chosen as generators in C 1 , C 2 and Id q (Z n ).
In the case of cyclic subgroups C 1 and C 2 their orders and orders of their generators are defined by the Carmichael function λ(n). We propose to choose C 1 and C 2 of maximal orders. In the case of n = pq the Carmichael function is equal to λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) where lcm stands for least common multiple. Since λ(n) < φ(n) if gcd(p − 1, q − 1) = 1, the Carmichael function defines the maximal order of cyclic subgroups C 1 and C 2 . We propose to use a composite integer n satisfying relation:
In this case |C 1 | = |C 2 | = |Id q (Z n )| = λ(n) and hence the elements q ij of matrix Q are of the same order r = λ(n) and the power matrices X and Y are in the power ring M R , where R = Z λ(n) .
We can prevent the direct application of discrete logarithm function to (13) and related isomorphism by choosing at least one element of the matrix Q from Id q (Z n ). Since Z ♯ n is a semigroup, it has no isomorphism splitting it to the direct product of several cyclic groups with discrete logarithm function defined. In this case the discrete logarithm of the base matrix Q cannot be defined.
We consider the security of the presented cipher in the sense of Alice's private key PrK A recovery from her public key PuK A . This means, that an adversary must find matrices X and U when matrices Q, Z 1 , Z 2 , A 1 , A 2 and E are given. To break the cipher adversary must find any matricesX andŨ satisfying equations:
such that for any matrices V = P V (Z 1 ) · P V (Z 2 ) and Y ∈ M R the following identity holds
Let us consider the protocol, suggested in Mihalkovich and Sakalauskas (2012) . There only one matrix (we shall denote it by Z) is used for conjugation constrain in stead of matrices Z 1 and Z 2 , i.e.
XZX
−1 = A.
By powering both sides of Eq. (13) by Z on the right and A on the left and since U = P U (Z) and XZ = AX, we can get the following equation:
Let us denote P = Z Q Z and H = A E Z , obtaining the following equation:
Since all elements of P and H are in Id q (Z n ), which is a cyclic group generated by its element g, the discrete logarithm of both sides of Eq. (15) can be taken, then:
Note, that in the last equation we did not apply a discrete logarithm to matrix Q (since it is not possible), but nevertheless we obtained an MMQ problem to find unknown matrices X and U . Hence as we can see the initial MPF problem can be reduced to an MMQ problem even if discrete logarithm of Q cannot be defined. The question is if the solution of Eq. (16) is a way to break the cipher, i.e. if it also satisfies Eq. (13). To give an appropriate answer to this question we must consider two cases:
• Matrix Z is invertible.
• Matrix Z is singular.
If matrix Z is invertible, then raising both sides of Eq. (15) to Z −1 on the right and to A −1 on the left we get Eq. (13). The inverse of matrix A exists, since it is similar to matrix Z. Hence in this case the solutions of Eq. (16) also satisfy Eq. (13) and an MPF problem can be reduced to an MMQ problem regardless of the choice of a base matrix Q and its discrete logarithm existence. If matrix Z is singular, then matrices Z −1 and A −1 do not exist, which makes raising to these powers impossible. However in this case an adversary may calculate a matrix Z = aZ + bI , where I is the identity matrix and a and b are coefficients in Z λ(n) . Let matrixZ be invertible for some fixed coefficients a and b. SinceZ commutes with Z it also commutes with matrix U . Furthermore, it can easily be shown, that XZ =ÃX, whereÃ = aA + bI . An adversary can then use matricesÃ andZ to reduce Eq. (13) to Eq. (16). Hence an MPF problem can be reduced to an MMQ problem in case of a singular matrix Z. We name this attack as the discrete logarithm attack.
However if two non-commuting matrices Z 1 and Z 2 are used, then a non-trivial matrix (i.e. matrix not equal to bI ) commuting with U cannot be found. In this case the reduction of Eq. (13) is not possible if matrices Z 1 Q and Z 2 Q do not have a discrete logarithm. Hence the necessary conditions to avoid discrete logarithm attack are the following:
• The platform matrix semigroup must be defined over Z ♯ n .
• Matrices Z 1 and Z 2 must be non-commuting.
• Discrete logarithm of matrices Q, Z 1 Q and Z 2 Q must not be determined.
Security Parameters Definition and Their Secure Values Determination
The suggested protocol has two main security parameters: parameter n defining group Z ♯ n and the matrix order m. Since we obtain commutating matrices using polynomials while non-singular matrices X and Y can be chosen freely, then to determine main security parameters we are making reference to the following facts:
• The number of matrices commuting with a public matrix Z 1 , defined over a power ring, should be at least 2 80 . Every commuting matrix should be obtained using polynomials over R of matrix Z 1 . The same should be valid for Z 2 .
• The number of matrices conjugating with a public matrix Z 1 , defined over a power ring should be at least 2 80 . The same should be valid for Z 1 .
Let us consider commutation and conjugation equations in a ring Z r , where r = 2s is the value of a Carmichael function λ(n) and s is prime. It was shown in Mihalkovich and Sakalauskas (2012) , that these equations can be considered separately in fields Z 2 and Z s . The number of solutions of commutation and conjugation equations is equal to:
where N 2 and N s are numbers of solutions of the corresponding equation in fields Z 2 and Z s . Let us denote Z 1 = Z for short and consider the commutation equation
which is defined over the field Z s . Let us assume, that matrix Z is similar to Jordan matrix, i.e. it can be expressed in the following canonical Jordan form
where J Z is a Jordan matrix
. . .
µ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ l are distinct eigenvalues of Z, J k i (µ i ) are Jordan blocks
of order k i and k 1 + k 2 + · · · + k l = m. Hence we get the following equation
We can now multiply (21) by K on the left and by K −1 on the right to get
Let us denoteX = KXK −1 . Thus we get
Then all matricesX commuting with J Z have a following form:
where matrices R k i have an upper regular form:
We can now see from (25), that the block R k i has k i different parameters a 1 , . . . , a k i .
Since |Z s | = s and k 1 + k 2 + · · · + k l = m it is clear, that there are s m different matrices commuting with J Z . Hence by (24) and (25) Note, that not all matrices satisfying Eq. (17) have an inverse because zero value cannot be chosen for diagonal elements. If we omit zero diagonal elements we get exactly s (m−l) (p − 1) l invertible matrices satisfying Eq. (17).
It has been proven in Gantmacher (1966) , that for matrix Z satisfying Proposition 1 every commuting matrix can be expressed as a polynomial of Z. The degree of polynomial is equal to m since there are m linearly independent matrices commuting with Z. Since matrices Z 1 and Z 2 have to be non-commuting we suggest, that these matrices should be similar to Jordan matrices (19) with distinct orders of Jordan blocks (20) .
It can now easily be shown, that the number of solutions of (17) defined over a ring Z s is r m . Furthermore s (m−l) φ l (r) of these solutions are invertible.
The conjugation equations (11) and (12) can be considered in a similar way. Each of these equation has s (m−l) φ l (r) solutions if matrices Z s = Z mod s and Z 2 = Z mod 2 are similar to Jordan matrices (19).
Keeping this in mind the choice of parameters is as follows:
1. Since the platform matrix semigroup has to be defined over a non-cyclic semigroup Z ♯ n we choose n = 3p which yields λ(n) = p − 1 and λ(n) = 2(p − 1). We suggest a prime number p = 2q + 1, where q is also prime. This yields λ(n) = 2q. The ideal of the group Z n is Id 3 (Z n ) = {3i; i = 1, 2, . . . , 2q} and Z ♯ n = Z * n ∪ Id 3 (Z n ). Hence S = Z ♯ n and R = Z 2q . 2. Since discrete logarithm of matrices Q, Z 1 Q and Z 2 Q must not exist we suggest, that one element of matrix Q should be chosen as a generator of Id 3 (Z n ) and all the other elements should be chosen as generators maximal order subgroups of Z * n . 3. Since we consider Eqs. (11), (12) and (17) defined over a ring Z 2q and matrices Z 1 and Z 2 have to be non-commuting we must at least two distinct eigenvalues to construct Jordan matrices J Z 1 and J Z 2 . According to our conjectured requirement the number r (m−2) (q − 1) 2 must be greater than or equal to 2 80 . Since q − 1 = n−9
6 and r = n−3 3 we get
where ⌈ ⌉ is the ceiling function. 4. According to obtained security parameters estimates the following information should be stored for cipher protocol realization:
• Multiplication and exponential tables to perform elementary operations with matrices in M S .
• Addition and multiplication tables to perform elementary operations with matrices in M R .
• Public matrix Q ∈ M S .
• Public non-commuting matrices Z 1 , Z 2 ∈ M R .
• Private matrix X ∈ M R and a set of coefficients defined in R (private key).
• Public matrices X Q U ∈ M S and XZ 1 X −1 , XZ 2 X −1 ∈ M R (public key).
Since addition and multiplication of two matrix elements are commuting, it is not necessary to store all elements of these tables. Hence we can store (n−3)(n−2) 2 elements for actions in Z ♯ n and λ(n)(λ(n)+1) 2 elements for actions in Z 2q . The exponential table consists of (n − 3) · λ(n) elements. Each matrix consists of m 2 elements and each element consists of ⌈log 2 n⌉ or ⌈log 2 λ(n)⌉ bits depending on a ring. Let us consider the first five suitable values of n: 15, 21, 33, 69 and 141. The results are shown in Table 1 .
We can see from Table 1 , that memory requirements are the lowest if n = 33. After that memory requirements tend to increase. However, if we consider private and public keys lengths, we can see, that as parameter n increases, the keys tend to shorten. This means, that parameter n must be chosen taking into consideration memory requirements.
According to results presented in paper of Mihalkovich and Sakalauskas (2013) accepted for publication describing the algorithm presented in Mihalkovich and Sakalauskas (2012) the encryption time is less than of other known algorithm. The computational time estimation was performed with El-Gamal-2048 and ECC-521 encryption algorithms. Obtained results showed, that proposed algorithm in the case of n = 33 operates at least 8.6 times faster than these known existing algorithms. Furthermore, experimental results showed, that computational time tends to decrease when parameter n increases.
Note, however, that the suggested algorithm requires calculating a polynomial for matrices Z 1 and Z 2 , whereas the algorithm presented in Mihalkovich and Sakalauskas (2012) uses only one matrix Z as an argument of a polynomial to be computed. Since most of computational time is used on calculating polynomials, the proposed algorithm in the case of n = 33 is 4.6 times faster than the traditional encryption algorithms mentioned above.
Concerning the effective realization of the proposed algorithm in computation restricted embedded systems we can make a conclusion, that n = 69 can be recommended, since this value provides a good compromise between the storage memory and computational time consumption.
Conclusions
The cryptanalysis of proposed cipher according to potential attacks is performed. According to this cryptanalysis the security parameters are defined. The estimation of security parameters values is obtained. According to these estimations the set of suitable security parameters values is presented.
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Naujas asimetrinio šifravimo algoritmas paremtas MLF, priklausantis nekomutatyviosios kriptografijos rūšiai
Eligijus SAKALAUSKAS, Aleksėjus MICHALKOVIČ Straipsnyje pateikiamas naujas asimetrinio šifravimo algoritmas, paremtas matricinio laipsnio funkcija (MLF). Šifras priklauso besivystančiai nekomutatyviosios kriptografijos rūšiai. Tikimasi, kad šis algoritmas yra atsparus patencialiai kvantinei kriptoanalizei.
Straipsnyje apibrėžiamos algebrinės struktūros, naudojamos šifravimo algoritmui konstruoti. Atlikta saugumo analizė bei apibrėžti saugumo parametrai. Remiantis šiais tyrimais, nustatytos saugios parametrų reikšmės. Pateikamas pasiūlyto algoritmo su skirtingomis saugumo parametrų reikšmėmis realizavimo mikroprocesoriuose efektyvumo palyginimas.
